Exploiting Weak Shellcode Hashes to Thwart Module Discovery; or, Go Home, Malware, You’re Drunk!

What does a cult Brezhnev-era movie have to do with how exploit code finds its bearings in a Windows process’ address space? How can cryptographically insecure hashing functions be exploited to create honeypots that thwart shellcode? We researched this as a part of our Halting Attacks Via Obstructing Configurations project, funded by DARPA Cyber Fast Track. You can read about it in the International Journal of PoC||GTFO, issue 0x12.

Unintended Consequences of Equation Group Malware

Can wrongfully or rightfully convicted criminals start to seek appeals on the basis of new evidence that shows that our Forensic “Experts” rely heavily on forensic write-blockers that can be proven to be worthless when their is malware inside the firmware of the device you are creating a forensic image of?

Random Solutions Are Often Good Enough

There is a subfield of computer science known as approximation algorithms whose goal is to find algorithms that can quickly find solutions that are not necessarily optimal, but are within some known bound of optimal. Under very reasonable assumptions, the expected value for the constant of approximation of a randomly selected feasible solution is almost always going to at most two. We present some empirical evidence suggesting that the random solutions are often even closer to optimal than ones produced by state-of-the-art approximation algorithms. Sometimes quickly and mindlessly choosing a random solution isn’t half bad!